This paper analyzes the debt-equity choice for …nancing a two-stage investment when a …rm's insiders have private information about the …rm's expected earnings. When private information is one-dimensional (for example when short-term earnings are common knowledge while long-term earnings are private information) a separating equilibrium does not exist. When private information is two-dimensional a separating equilibrium may exist where …rms with a higher rate of earnings growth issue debt and …rms with a low rate of earnings growth issue equity. This provides new insights into the issue of di¤erent kinds of securities by di¤erent types of …rms under asymmetric information as well as the link between debtequity choice and operating performance. Abstract. This paper analyzes the debt-equity choice for …nancing a twostage investment when a …rm's insiders have private information about the …rm's expected earnings. When private information is one-dimensional (for example when short-term earnings are common knowledge while long-term earnings are private information) a separating equilibrium does not exist. When private information is two-dimensional a separating equilibrium may exist where …rms with a higher rate of earnings growth issue debt and …rms with a low rate of earnings growth issue equity. This provides new insights into the issue of di¤er-ent kinds of securities by di¤erent types of …rms under asymmetric information as well as the link between debt-equity choice and operating performance.
Introduction
This paper analyzes debt-equity choice when asymmetric information exists between …rms'insiders and market participants regarding future earnings. Most existing literature deals with one-dimensional asymmetric information-most frequently concerning the value of the …rm. In this approach the solution is typically a pooling equilibrium where the "bad" type (one with low value) mimics the "good" type (one with high value) by issuing the same kind of securities. A "second e¤ort" (additional assumptions) is needed to explain why …rms issue securities that are not a part of the equilibrium.
In the present paper, we analyze a signaling game where private information is two-dimensional: the insiders have private information about the amounts and timing of future earnings.
1 Asymmetric information about the timing of earnings may take place because: 1) managers may have private information about the choice of inventory and depreciation methods, allowance for bad debts, expensing of research and development, recognition of sales not yet shipped, estimation of pension liabilities, capitalization of leases and marketing expenses, delay in maintenance expenditures and delay in production; 2) managers may be subject to moral hazard problems which a¤ect the intensity and productivity of their e¤orts over time and; 3) corporations typically employ long-term strategic planning, giving insiders private information for several years.
We analyze a two-stage investment-…nancing model where managers representing initial shareholders have the choice between debt (short-and long-term) and equity. When only the total earnings are private information, and the timing of earnings is common knowledge, the equilibrium is pooling. However, when both the value of the …rm and the timing of earnings is management's private information a separating equilibrium may exist. The following explains the main ideas behind the separating equilibrium. First, it is well known that in a separating equilibrium each …nancing strategy is chosen by the worst possible type of …rm for that strategy (from the investor's viewpoint). 2 Otherwise the …rm will be mimicked by other …rms which will bene…t from the overvaluation of issued securities. We show that the value of shares depends on the …rm's total value and not on the timing of earnings or on the rate of earnings growth; the value of long-term debt relies on the expected performance in the long term and the value of short-term debt depends primarily on the expected performance in the short term. If a …rm with a high rate of earnings growth issues long-term debt it will be mimicked because of high expected long-term performance which implies a high value of long-term debt respectively. The same holds if the …rm issues equity. Other …rms may …nd it attractive to mimic this strategy not necessarily because of the high value of equity but because of the high value of future claims which the …rm will issue in the long term. Thus, if the …rm with a high rate of earnings growth and low short-term earnings respectively tries to separate itself in equilibrium it would do better to issue claims with the value depending primarily on short-term expected performance (short-term debt).
The main engine driving the results of the paper is that a separating equilibrium exists where …rms with low rates of earnings growth issue equity. This equilibrium implies that …rms issuing equity have better operating performance at the moment of issue or in the near future after issue, and that these …rms have lower operating performance in the long run. The long run operating underperformance of equity issuing …rms has been documented in several studies. This phenomenon is characterized by Ritter and Welch (2002) as the most controversial area of IPO (initial public o¤ering) research. Whereas only a few studies support the e¢ cient market point of view, others argue in favor of a behavioral point of view. 3 The superior absolute performance of equity issuing …rms immediately after the issue is, to our knowledge, a relatively new theoretical point. 4 In contrast to the well-documented fact that …rms issuing equity have higher performance just before the issue, their higher absolute performance immediately after the issue has not been a major point of empirical research (though it seems to be consistent with some empirical evidence). According to Jain and Kini (1994, Figure 1 ) the operating return on assets is higher for IPO …rms in the …rst years after the issue and the operating cash ‡ow on assets is higher in year "0" (immediately after issue). In Loughran and Ritter (1997) pro…t margins are higher in years 0 and +1, although there is di¤erent evidence about operating returns. In Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997 , Table 3 ) IPO …rms have higher performance in year 0.
The model also generates new predictions which have not been tested in existing literature. In particular, we study how the following factors a¤ect the conditions of existence for separating equilibrium: bankruptcy costs (reorganization costs), the extent of asymmetric information regarding …rms'values and the timing of earnings. For example, we argue that the emergence of separating equilibrium and phenomena such as long-term underperformance of …rms issuing equity are more probable when the extent of asymmetric information regarding the timing of earnings is relatively large and that regarding total earnings is relatively small. When the di¤erence between …rms'total values is large enough a separating equilibrium does not exist because the type with a low total value will mimic the high value type. On the other hand, a large di¤erence in the …rms'rates of earnings growth contributes to the existence of a separating equilibrium by making it possible for a …rm to design debt claims which will not be mimicked by other …rms. We provide a discussion of possible strategies for testing this result.
The model in the present paper is closely related to the "pecking-order theory" put forward by Myers and Majluf (1984) . They consider a single-stage investment model in which asymmetric information exists about the value of both assets in place and the new project.
5 While it provides many important insights into …rm behavior under asymmetric information, most notably the underinvestment problem and why …rms may prefer internal …nancing to external …nancing, it does not explain why …rms issue equity. Myers (1984) argues that when …rms have dividend ratio constraints or external debt constraints, they may issue equity. However, some research demonstrates that …rms issue equity even when they are not …nancially constrained (see, for instance, Loughran and Ritter, 1997) . Lucas and McDonald (1990) also analyze …rms' incentives to issue equity under asymmetric information. If a …rm requires funding for a project that has a long-term decision horizon and a delay in accepting the project has low cost, then an undervalued …rm will choose to delay issuing equity until the true value of the …rm is revealed and the share price rises. Thus, the paper explains why, on average, positive abnormal returns will precede equity issues and why decreases in stock prices often accompany stock issue announcements while it is not focused on the correlation between debt and pro…tability and on operating performance after issue.
Our model is also related to Goswami, Noe and Rebello (1995) where a …rm's managers have long term private information about the …rm's quality. This paper focuses on the debt maturity choice. The absence of second-period investments, together with the assumption that a …rms' overall cash ‡ows are ordered by …rst-order stochastic dominance, precludes any prediction about the issuance of equity in Goswami, Noe and Rebello (1995) . In this case, both long term debt and equity represent claims on the …rm's total cash ‡ow, and thus equity is eliminated by the standard pecking order argument (Nachman and Noe, 1994) .
Finally note that our results also compliment Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1992) where …rms choose to issue equity when the extent of asymmetric information regarding …rms'values is relatively low. In addition, we show that …rms issue equity when the asymmetry regarding the timing of earnings is relatively high.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a basic model description. Section 3 analyses the separating equilibria. Section 4 presents the model implications and compares the results with other theories. Section 5 suggests several extensions of the basic model and discusses the robustness of its results. The conclusion is drawn in Section 6.
Basic model.
Consider a …rm with a two-stage investment project. In each period, indexed by t = 1; 2, an amount b has to be invested. In each period the project can either be successful or unsuccessful. There are two types of …rms: for …rm i the probability of success in period t equals it and for …rm s it is st . The cash ‡ow of type x = i; s in period t is denoted by r xt . In the case of success r xt = 1, otherwise r xt = 0. Total expected cash ‡ow for type x over both periods is then v x = x1 + x2 . We assume the 's are restricted to the interval (b; 1], which implies that the investment has positive net present value in each period. Firm i is "performance-improving" relative to …rm s ("stagnating") because
where g x denotes the rate of earnings growth ( x2 = x1 ). A …rm x has increasing expected cash ‡ows if g x > 1, and the cash ‡ow pro…le is ‡at or declining if g x = 1 or g x < 1 respectively. The …rm's performance can be described by a pair (v x , g x ) . The probabilities of success in each stage are then:
The extent of asymmetric information regarding long-term cash ‡ows is greater than or equal to that of short-term cash ‡ows:
Short-term performance may be signi…cantly related to the …rm's past activities which may be known to the public while long-term performance relies more heavily on new decisions. The …rm's pro…t is observable and veri…able. There exists universal riskneutrality and perfect competition among investors. This implies zero market pro…t and risk-neutral valuation for any security issued.
Financing strategies
In the …rst period the …rm x = i; s may issue equity (denote this strategy by e), short-term (d) or long-term debt (l).
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Equity …nancing. In the …rst period the …rm issues n x shares for the price p such that the amount of …nancing covers the investment needs: p n x = b where p denotes the market price of shares. After observing the …rst-period cash ‡ow r x1 the …rm may distribute dividends D 7 In the second period …rms do not …nance with equity. 8 Hence, in the second period, the …rm has the choice between internal …nancing and debt (the amount of debt equals b f rx1 x ). Denote the second-period debt face value by F rx1 2 . The second-period cash ‡ow r x2 is distributed, in total, to the claimholders.
Short-term debt. The …rm issues debt with face value F 1 which matures at t = 1. If r x1 = 0 (default) then two situations are possible. If V 2 F 1 (where V 2 is the …rm's going concern value expected by investors) then the …rm will rollover the existing debt by issuing a new claim with a real value equal to F 1 (Diamond (1991) , Goswami, Noe and Rebello (1995) ). If V 2 < F 1 then the creditors can get control over the …rm. If control passes to the creditors, the second-period value of the …rm is V c 2 = V 2 , where 2 [0; 1]. may have two interpretations. First, it may mean that there are bankruptcy or reorganization costs. An alternative interpretation is that the entrepreneur has a superior ability to run the …rm and its replacement reduces the …rm's value. To avoid a social loss when < 1 the …rm can continue operating under the control of the initial shareholders. This decision depends on the renegotiation between the entrepreneur and the creditors. The renegotiation is conducted in the following manner: the entrepreneur makes a "take-it-or-leave-it" o¤er to the creditors to exchange their existing claims for new claims with face value F r which mature in t = 2.
9 The creditors may accept or reject the o¤er. If the o¤er is rejected the creditors get the …rm's equity and the shareholders get nothing.
Long-term debt. Long-term debt has face value F 2 and matures in t = 2. It can be senior or junior. If it is senior then any new claim issued in the second period will be subordinated and vice versa. When long-term debt is junior, the …rm is always able to raise funds for …nancing the second stage when internal funds are insu¢ cient. However, if the …rm's expected cash ‡ow in the second stage is low and debt is senior, the …rm may be not able to raise funds to …nance the second stage. This may create a debt overhang problem. Since this leads to ine¢ ciency, the parties may renegotiate at the end of the …rst period. We continue to assume that shareholders make "take-or leave-it" o¤er to the creditors.
The …rm's type is revealed to the entrepreneur in period 0 while …nancing and investments take place in periods 1 and 2. The …rm's initial capital structure is 100% equity, with n shares outstanding. Let xt denote the proportion of equity owned by the entrepreneur in period t (immediately after the issue of securities in period t, if it takes place). Clearly, x0 = 1. The second-period …nancial outsiders observe the …rst-period capital structure choice and …rst-period cash ‡ow. Throughout this article, we use the concept of Perfect-Bayesian equilibria.
For our purposes it will be suitable to present a set of exogenous parameters describing the model as (v i ; g i ; v s ; g s ; b; ). In the next section we will analyze the parameter values under which a separating equilibrium may exist.
3 Separating equilibria.
When the extent of asymmetric information regarding …rms'total values is large, a separating equilibrium does not exist: the type with low value mimics that with high value. When the extent of asymmetric information regarding …rms' total values is relatively small and that concerning the timing of earnings is relatively large, a separating equilibrium may exist. In this case, i has lower performance in the …rst period and higher performance in the second period.
In such an environment, prices can be a¤ected by the "lemon" e¤ect in both periods. Intuitively, i has a "lemon" advantage in the …rst period: with lower pro…ts in this period, i can capitalize on the adverse selection problem. On the other hand, in the second period the "lemon" advantage passes to s. i and s face very di¤erent incentives regarding …nancial decisions. The point is that the price of …rst-period equity depends on the …rms'total values and it does not on the timing of cash ‡ows. As a result, if i were to issue equity in the …rst period, it cannot bene…t from its "lemon" advantage in the …rst period (given that the di¤erence between …rms'total values is low enough). Thus, i would always be mimicked by s, who stands to gain in the second period by being perceived as growing and, therefore, as expecting high pro…ts in the second period. The implication is that i is at a disadvantage for issuing equity in the …rst period. To signal its type, i can issue debt. In particular, if the cost of bankruptcy is high enough, …rst-period interest rates will be relatively high compared to those of the second period (since i is considered "bad"in the …rst period and "good" in the second). Given such an interest rate pro…le, we show that if s plays debt, it will be bene…cial to creditors, but not to the …rm. This is because creditors bene…t from the high interest rates in the …rst period and the fact that s does well in that period. In what follows we develop these ideas.
) be the expected payo¤ to the entrepreneur of type k (with total value v k and rate of growth g k ) if the strategy j; j 2 fe; d; lg is played and the type is perceived by the market as type m (with the parameters v m and g m ), k; m 2 fi; sg. A separating equilibrium is a situation where type i plays strategy j 1 , type s plays strategy j 2 and no type has an incentive to mimic the other type:
It is thus clear that the analysis of the V j km function is crucial. The value of V j km depends on the performance of type k and the prices of issued securities. The latter are equal to the symmetric information prices for type m which will be marked with subscript m, for instance the symmetric information share price for type m is p m and the face value of short-term debt is F m1 . We have:
] where k1 = n n+ n k = n n+b=pm denotes the fraction of equity retained by the entrepreneur after issuing shares and
] denotes the expected dividends in periods 1 and 2.
) Given i performs better than s in the second period, i will always use internal …nancing in the second period if available in order to avoid the lemon problem. In contrast, s pays out as much cash in dividends as possible and uses external …nancing. This is quite intuitive and thus formal proof is omitted for brevity. Finally, we have
Let us turn to strategy d. Consider r k1 = 0. If V 2 F m1 , where V 2 = m2 b, the …rm will issue a new claim which matures in t = 2 with the face value equal to F r m and with the real value equal to
. This claim will be sold for F m1 (recall that the creditors perceive the …rm as type m) and the proceeds from this issue will be used to pay o¤ the existing debt. If m2 b < F m1 then the shareholders will o¤er the creditors a fraction of the …rm's equity (it can be a new debt claim). This o¤er will be accepted because it provides the highest value (in case the …rm is m the value of equity o¤ered to the creditors equals ( m2 b)) the creditors can get through bankruptcy and getting control over the …rm (according to their equilibrium beliefs about the …rm's type). If the fraction of equity o¤ered to the creditors is less than the creditors will reject the o¤er. In this case the shareholders get nothing and thus they have no interest to do so. To summarize, we get the following. If
and otherwise
where F r m = F m1 = m2 . Similarly for strategy l we get the following.
The case 1 < F m2 + F 0 m2 never appears in equilibrium as shown in the Appendix (proof of Lemma 1).
The following lemma determines the prices of issued securities under symmetric information that that are necessary for the analysis of the V j km function. Lemma 1. If information is symmetric then for type x = i; s :
(10)
Financing with long-term debt is only possible if x2 2b and
(Proofs of all lemmas and propositions are collected in the Appendix) As one can see from Lemma 1 the values of di¤erent securities depend in di¤erent ways on the …rm's expected performance in each period. Since each type performs di¤erently in each period the value of securities issued by di¤erent types are di¤erent. To avoid mimicking, …rms will issue securities which have a lower value compared to the other type. In this sense the following remarks about Lemma 1 are useful. Equation (9) implies that p x depends only on the …rm's total pro…t and not on its pro…t pro…le over time. Total expected cash ‡ow equals x1 + x2 . Total investment is 2b. Total expected earnings are thus x1 + x2 2b which implies (9).
If x2 is su¢ ciently high ( x2 2b) then short-term debt is risk-free because the …rm can rollover this debt if r x1 = 0 (a similar situation occurs in, for instance, Flannery, 1986). If x2 < 2b then as follows from (10), the short-term debt face value is positively linked to the amount of borrowing and negatively related to both the expected performance in the …rst-and second-periods and to the reorganization costs.
For long-term debt, if x2 2b the value of debt depends only on the expected second-period performance. The …rm cannot default in the …rst period (it does not matter whether the debt is senior or not) and all …rst-period earnings will be distributed to the shareholders. This is because internal …nancing in the second period increases the value of the creditors claim and reduces the shareholders value. Now when x2 < 2b …nancing with long-term debt is impossible regardless of whether long-term is senior or not (although the explanations are di¤erent in both of these cases).
10 From (11) the second-period debt face value is positively linked to the amount of external …nancing in the second period and negatively related to both expected second-period performance and retained earnings. 1 0 If debt is subordinated then the …rm will also distribute all dividends to the shareholders and …nance the second stage by borrowing. External investors will agree to provide secondperiod …nancing because their claim will be senior. When x2 < 2b the expected payo¤ to the long-term creditors is less than b. If long-term debt is senior and x2 < 2b then in the end of the …rst period the …rm will face the debt overhang problem-it will not be able to raise funds for the second stage. To avoid a debt overhang problem the parties will renegotiate. The maximum payo¤ the long-term creditors can get in the second period equals the …rm's going concern value. Again when x2 < 2b the …rm's going concern value ( x2 2b) is less than b which in turn implies that the expected payo¤ to the long-term creditors cannot cover the investment cost.
It follows from Lemma 1 and the de…nition of V j km that V j kk = k1 + k2 2b for any j 2 fe; d; lg. The right side shows the expected payo¤ of type k under symmetric information: it equals total expected cash ‡ow minus the costs of investment which is not surprising in this Modigliani-Miller environment. This can be proven by substituting the prices of securities under symmetric information into the expressions for V j km : Lemma 1 has several implications for the existence of separating equilibrium. For instance, if i1 s1 or s2 i2 then one type has better performance than the other in both periods and thus by Lemma 1 any claim issued by this type has higher value.
Lemma 2. If i1 s1 or s2 i2 a separating equilibrium does not exist. Corollary 1. If g i = g s a separating equilibrium does not exist. It follows from Lemma 2 and Corollary 1 that if the …rms' rates of pro…t growth are equal or if one type has higher performance in both periods than the other, a separating equilibrium does not exist: the type with higher value will always be mimicked. We thus consider the case where the type with higher rate of earnings growth has lower performance in the …rst stage and higher performance in the second stage than the stagnating type:
The latter follows from (3) and (14). From (14) …rms with high rate of earnings growth have low performance in the …rst period and high performance in the second period relative to "stagnating" …rms. Intuitively, …rms with a high rate of earnings growth appear to have a "lemon" advantage in the …rst period: lower pro…ts in this period mean that this type of …rm can capitalize on the adverse selection problem. On the other hand, in the second period the "lemon" advantage passes to …rms with a low rate of earnings growth.
For our purposes the following de…nition will be useful. Let R j km be the expected surplus (the di¤erence between the expected equilibrium payo¤ and the symmetric information payo¤) to the entrepreneur of type k if the strategy j is played and the type is perceived by the market as the type m. R 
Lemma 3. @R j km =@v m > 0 for any j 2 fe; d; lg. On the intuitive level Lemma 3 is straightforward: under asymmetric information a …rm's expected surplus increases if the market value of the …rm (the value of the …rm from the investor's viewpoint) increases. A more intriguing question is how changes in a …rm's earnings growth rate a¤ect R j km . This question is at the core of the analysis below.
From (2) an increase in the rate of earnings growth increases the …rm's expected performance in the second period. We know, from Lemma 1, that the price of equity depends on the value of the …rm, and not just …rst-period performance. The value of any claim issued by the …rm in the second period depends heavily on the …rm's second-period expected performance. Hence an increase in the market's perception of the …rm's rate of earnings growth increases the expected payo¤ of the …rm issuing equity.
Lemma 4. @R e km =@g m > 0: Proposition 1. A separating equilibrium where i issues equity does not exist.
Proposition 1 is based on Lemmas 3 and 4, and on (15) and (16). An explanation for this result is as follows. Since the price of equity depends on the value of the …rm, and not just …rst-period performance, i cannot bene…t from its "lemon" advantage in the …rst period. Moreover, i will lose in the second period because of s's "lemon" advantage in this period. While when r i1 = 1, i can use internal …nancing to mitigate the adverse selection problem linked to external …nancing in the second period, this problem is inevitable if r i1 = 0. This logic also underlines the existence of a separating equilibrium, where i uses debt …nancing and s uses equity …nancing.
Consider a separating equilibrium where s plays equity and i plays shortterm debt. This equilibrium exists if and only if the following holds:
The …rst condition is the non-deviation condition for s. The second condition is the non-deviation condition for i. Applying the above reasoning one can show that i will not mimic s when the latter issues equity and (19) holds. Now consider (18). This only holds under some values of the parameters and does not hold otherwise. If the second-period expected performance of type i is high enough to cover the cost of investment over both periods ( i2 2b) a separating equilibrium does not exist: s mimics i because s bene…ts from the low face value of debt in the second period while …rst-period debt is risk-free by Lemma 1 and it does not imply any value loss for s. We thus continue with the case i2 < 2b. Generally speaking, for i to separate from s, i must issue claims with a value which depends heavily on …rst-period expected performance when i is weak.
Recall that the set of model parameters is (v i ; g i ; v s ; g s ; b; ). We will show that there exists a clear role for every parameter in balancing the weights of …rst-period and second-period expected performances in the value of debt. Lemma 5. @R d si =@ > 0: The intuition behind Lemma 5 is as follows. If is low then …rst-period creditors will not signi…cantly rely on the …rm's second period performance. Low implies high reorganization costs or that it is costly to transfer ownership from the shareholders to creditors if the …rm defaults in the …rst period. Thus the …rm's …rst-period expected performance becomes crucial in valuing debt. Since i has low …rst-period expected performance, mimicking i is not pro…table for s and vice versa. Lemma 5 leads to the following proposition.
Corollary
(other parameters being equal).
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Proposition 2. A separating equilibrium where i issues short-term debt and s issues equity exists if and only if exists (Corollary 2) and : Now consider how changes in v's and g's a¤ect the existence of equilibrium. Two ideas underline the analysis below. First when the di¤erence between …rms' total values is large enough a separating equilibrium does not exist because the type with a low total value will mimic the high value type. On the other hand, a large di¤erence in the …rms'rates of earnings growth contributes to the existence of equilibrium by making it possible for i to design debt claims which will not be mimicked by s.
Lemma 6. 1) Either R Proposition 3 follows directly from Lemma 6 and our previous discussion of this equilibrium (equations (18) and (19)). Similarly we have the following results. A separating equilibrium where i issues short-term debt and s issues equity exists if g i is su¢ ciently high (other parameters being equal) and v i is su¢ ciently low (close to v s ). Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 3. Here g i = 1:5; v i = 1:6; i1 = 0:64; i2 = 0:96; b = 0:6 and = 0:4. The …gure shows under which values of g s and v s separating equilibriums may exist. In the space below the thick line (A) the separating equilibrium, where i plays debt and s plays equity, exists. In B the separating equilibrium does not exist. Note that for any value of v s a separating equilibrium exists if g s is low enough and for any g s a separating equilibrium exists if v s is high enough. In other words a separating equilibrium exists if asymmetric information about rate of earnings growth is more important than that concerning the …rms'total values. Also note that a separating equilibrium does not exist when g s = g i = 1:5 for any value of v s as was discussed in Section 3.1.
1 1 Long mathematical expressions showing the cuto¤ value are omitted for brevity. Also note that the corner solution condition when R d si > 0 for any value of is given by substituting = 0 in (18) which is: s1 = i1 + s2 = i2 2. Its analysis is also omitted for brevity as well as some corner conditions for following propositions because they do not add a lot of new intuitions besides those described in the text. Finally we have the following result. Proposition 4. A separating equilibrium where i issues long-term debt does not exist.
By Lemma 1, the value of long-term debt corresponding to type i is lower than that of type s and therefore if this type issues long-term debt it will be mimicked by s.
Implications.
The analysis of this paper implies that when private information is two-dimensional and contains information about …rm value and the cash ‡ow pro…le over time, the choice between debt and equity may be used as a signaling device. A separating equilibrium may exist where type i issues debt and type s issues equity. This equilibrium has the following predictions:
(i) Firms issuing equity have lower operating performance in the long run as compared to non-issuing …rms ( s2 < i2 ). This conclusion is con…rmed by empirical …ndings for IPO …rms (see, among others, Jain and Kini (1994) , Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998), Cai and Wei (1997) , Mikkelson et al. (1997) and Purnanandam and Swaminathian (2004) ) and for SEO (seasoned equity issues) …rms (Loughran and Ritter, 1997) . 12 (ii) These …rms have a lower ratio of long-term earnings to short-term earnings as compared to nonissuing …rms (g s < g i ). (iii) The absolute performance of …rms issuing equity exceeds the performance of non-issuing …rms at the time of issue or in the near future after issue ( s1 > i1 ).
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Existing literature suggests few explanations for the long-term underperformance of …rms issuing equity. Among basic rational market intuitions, the 1 2 Note that in the context of our model, the non-equity-issuing …rms are actually the ones who issue debt. As Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000) mention, and Eckbo and Norli (2001) empirically con…rm, issuing …rms have lower leverage relative to non-issuing …rms. This is consistent with the idea that, unlike issuing …rms, non-issuing …rms prefer debt …nancing.
1 3 The empirical evidence on this point was discussed in the introduction.
following theories are notable. The theory of agency cost of equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) underlines the idea that equity issues decrease the manager's stake in the company and reduce the incentive to undertake value maximizing projects. This results in afterissuing underperformance of the …rm, though the theory does not compare the performance in the short run with that in the long run after the issue. Also note that the link between afterissuing underperformance and a low managerial fraction of equity is empirically controversial. For instance, Pagano et al. (1998) , Cai and Loughran (1998) and Mickelson et al. (1997) do not con…rm the positive correlation between the fraction of insiders' equity and …rm performance. The trade-o¤ theory in its standard form, proposing that …rms equalize the marginal tax bene…ts associated with additional debt to the marginal cost of bankruptcy, suggests that more pro…table …rms should issue more debt. However, it will not predict the link between debt-equity choice and dynamic pro…le of performance after the issue (long-term performance versus short-term performance). For instance, it will predict that type s (high expected performance in the …rst period) should issue more debt than i in the …rst period in contrast to our results. According to the free cash ‡ow theory (Jensen, 1986) debt is an instrument for solving the problem of a manager's entrenchment and thus more debt should lead to higher overall performance. However, this theory does not give an explanation for why …rms should issue equity. This theory would also suggest that type s (with high expected performance in the …rst period) should issue debt in order to prevent managers from overspending. Recently several dynamic versions of the trade-o¤ model were developed which combine taxes, bankruptcy costs and di¤erent kinds of agency costs. Typically, these models lead to less extreme and more realistic predictions than the basic ideas do. However, we have not found a model which systematically analyzes the link between debt-equity choice and dynamic pro…le of operating performance after the issue. We will provide more discussion of dynamic trade-o¤ models later when we discuss the correlation between debt and pro…tability.
The market timing argument (see, for instance, Baker and Wurgler, 2002 ) points out that while in Modigliani and Miller environment the capital structure decisions are not a¤ected by the magnitude of share prices or by the "hotness" of the market, in reality one observes that …rms tend to issue equity when the market prices are relatively high and do not issue equity when the prices are relatively low. To relate this observation to the evidence about operating performances, one line of the literature focuses on non-rational aspects of investors behavior. For instance, some research argues that investors tend to be overoptimistic during new issues or that the analysts'forecasts are inadequately high. 14 The …rms thus sell shares when they are overvalued or the …rm is expected to perform poorly compared to the price of the issue. Theo, Welch and Wong (1998) argue that managers manipulate earnings (sacri…ce future earnings by pushing up current earnings) prior to going public in order to attract more non-informed investors. We share with this paper the idea that managers may be involved in earnings management leading to their private information about the timing of cash ‡ows. However our framework assumes completely rational investors which infer information about a …rm's earnings pro…le from observing its …nancing decision. 15 The di¤erence between these two approaches (rational market versus non-rational) is not only theoretical. Some recent empirical research argues in favor of e¢ cient market version of the market timing argument (Schultz (2003) and Butler, Grullon and Weston (2005) ) -"pseudo-market timing"-where shares are not overpriced.
When investors are rational the prices are supposed to correctly re ‡ect …rms' current and future earnings and not only current earnings. In such an environment and assuming that there is no asymmetric information or agency costs, how can one explain that …rst, …rms time their issues and second, why the …rms issue shares when operating performance is high and why it becomes low in the long run after issue? The literature based on rational investors is able to argue why …rms may be interested in issuing equity in periods when market prices are high although it is not focused on explaining the link between debt-equity choice and changes in operating performance after issue (long-term versus short-term). 16 Below we show that the separating equilibrium described in this paper is consistent with market timing (or rather "pseudo-market timing") empirical evidence. In period 0 before the information about the …rm type is acquired by managers and before the …nancing decision is made the market share price equals p 0 = (v i 2b)=n + (1 )(v s 2b)=n, where denotes the proportion of …rms of type i. After the managers of type s get information about earnings they will realize that the true value of type s shares is (v s 2b)=n. Since the market price will still remain the same because the investors do not know the …rm's type the managers of type s will see their shares to be overvalued if > 0: p 0 > (v s 2b)=n which follows from (16). They then issue equity. Investors will infer correctly that equity is issued by type s. The price fall during the issue of shares re ‡ects the well-known underpricing of newly issued shares phenomenon. Also the second-period share price of type S (p s2 ) is lower than its …rst-period price.
Proposition 5. In a separating equilibrium where i issues debt and s issues equity p 0 > p s > p s2 :
Note that the investors remain completely rational in our model and have zero-pro…t in equilibrium.
Both the agency and trade-o¤ theory also provide insight into market timing. According to the debt overhang problem (Myers, 1977) an excessive senior debt may lead the …rm to forego some valuable investment opportunities. Thus, a …rm with high market value of shares and good investment opportunities respectively will lose more from underinvestment and will thus issue equity instead. However it is not straightforward to predict a link between equity issues and subsequent operating performance consistent with observable evidence without making additional assumptions about, for instance, the link between share price and current operating performance. 17 An advantage of the present paper compared to Myers (1977) (and some other theories mentioned in this section) is that it is not based on the link between pro…tability and investment opportunities (for instance Jain and Kini (1994) and Loughran and Ritter (1997) do not …nd that afterissuing underperformance is due to the lower or higher amounts of investment). In our model, all …rms invest the same amount of funds and the di¤erence comes only from future operating performance pro…les. Finally note that Baker and Wrugler (2002) do not …nd a lot of support for underinvestment theory of market timing.
(iv) The model predicts that leverage is negatively correlated with pro…tabil-ity.
18 To see this let us look at the dynamics of capital structure (in market values) of both types of …rms over two periods. Consider the basic model and a separating equilibria where i issues short-term debt and s issues equity. In period 1 (after the securities are issued until the earnings are received) the debt/equity ratio of type s is 0 and that of type i is b=(v i 2b) (the denominator shows the market value of …rm's equity). It is clear that the debt/equity ratio of type i is higher than that of type s while the opposite is true for average earnings in the …rst period. This conclusion does not change if one measures debt/equity ratios at the end of …rst period (after the earnings are received but before second-period …nancing decision is made). In the second period (after the second-period …nancing decision is made and before the second-period earnings are received) the debt/equity ratio of type s is b=( s2 b) and that of type i is b=( i2 b). We see that the debt/equity ratio of type s is higher because s2 < i2 which con…rms the negative correlation between debt and pro…tability in the second period as well.
Note that the trade-o¤ theory in its standard form is inconsistent with the negative correlation between debt and pro…tability because highly-pro…table …rms should tend to …nance with debt in order to reduce their taxes. Hennessy and Whited (2005) develop a dynamic trade-o¤ theory with the idea that a profitable …rm does not have to distribute its earnings immediately as the standard models assume. This may reduce the incentive to reduce taxes by issuing debt. The …nancing decision depends on the next period …nancing margin or what the …rm is going to do in the future: to issue more equity, to distribute more earnings or to remain neutral. While providing a valid intuition about why the static trade-o¤ may not work, the authors do not obtain a theoretical propo-sition about the link between debt and pro…tability. However, they do show numerically that under some plausible values of parameters one can observe the negative correlation between debt and pro…tability in their model. Zwiebel (1996) develops a dynamic model of capital structure based on the managers' entrenchment argument. The paper suggests that when a …rm has more valuable investment opportunities the need to issue new debt as a disciplinary device decreases which leads to the situation where …rms with lower debt are likely to be more pro…table. While providing an idea about the negative correlation between debt and pro…tability the paper does not explain why …rms issuing equity underperform in the long run. Also equity …nancing is not explicitly analyzed in the model.
Several empirical predictions which have not been tested in the literature follow from Propositions 2 and 3. (v) Long-term operating underperformance of …rms issuing equity should more frequently be observed when reorganization costs increase (Proposition 2); (vi) this phenomenon should more frequently be observed when asymmetric information regarding the timing of cash ‡ows is larger than that regarding the total cash ‡ows (Proposition 3). Possible tests of these predictions will be based on identifying …rms and industries with high and low reorganization costs (bankruptcy cost). For industries with high reorganization costs the underperformance of …rms issuing equity should be a more frequent phenomenon. One can also use the spread in analysts'valuations of …rms'shares as a proxy for the extent of asymmetric information regarding the …rms'total values and the spread in the forecasts of future earnings (longterm spread versus short-term spread) as a proxy for asymmetric information about future rates of earnings growth. Also …rms manipulating earnings prior to issue (as in Theo and all, 1998) can be seen as ones with high degree of asymmetric information about timing of earnings since earnings management can often be seen as a redistribution of earnings between periods rather than accounting fraud (Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999) .
Finally the model sheds some new light on possible motives for …rms to use such …nancial instruments as dividend covenants, asset-backed securities and non-recourse debt which we discuss in the next section.
5 The model extensions.
5.1. Long-term debt with dividend covenants. Long-term debt can be issued with dividend covenants. The latter can establish maximal amount (Y ) of dividends the …rm is allowed to pay in the …rst period. Intuitively a low Y makes payments to creditors depend more heavily on the …rst-period cash ‡ow. This allows type i to explore its informational advantage related to their low …rst-period performance. One can show that a separating equilibrium may exist where i issues long-term debt with dividend covenants and s issues equity. The existence of this equilibrium is negatively related to the extent of asymmetric information regarding the …rms' values and positively related to the extent of asymmetric information regarding the rates of earnings growth con…rming the …ndings in basic model. 5.2. Mixed …nancing. In this subsection we allow the …rm to issue any mix of di¤erent securities for …nancing. Allowing mixed …nancing provides little usefulness for the analysis of operating performance of …rms issuing equity versus that of non-issuing …rms. The reason is that most empirical literature on this topic does not di¤erentiate issuers according to fractions of equity in capital structure. Even a marginally small issue of shares puts a …rm into the category of issuing …rms. Thus it will be hard to interpret the equilibrium in terms of existing empirical evidence. However, allowing for mixed …nancing is important with regard to the conclusions about the negative correlation between debt and pro…tability and more interestingly about the conditions of existence of this phenomena which constitute an addition to the literature on this phenomena.
Let
where b e and b d denote equity and debt (for simplicity of exposition we assume that debt is short-term). 19 Hence the …rst-period …nancing policy can be described by, for instance, a variable b e , 0 b e b. Note that b e = 0 corresponds to pure short-term debt …nancing and b e = b corresponds to pure equity …nanc-ing. Denote the entrepreneur's expected payo¤ if the type is k, strategy b e is played and the type is perceived by the market as m by V km (b e ).
The scenario when b d > 0 and r x1 = 0 is analogous to pure short-term debt …nancing. If V 2 F 1 the shareholders will o¤er the creditors a new claim with the real value equal F 1 . This o¤er will be accepted because it is the best claim the creditors can get if they appeal. If the real value of new claim is less than F 1 the court will force an increase in the value of the new claim. If V 2 < F 1 then the shareholders will o¤er the creditors a fraction of the …rm's equity. This o¤er will be accepted because it is the best value the creditors can get through bankruptcy and getting the control over the …rm.
With mixed …nancing, …rms have a much greater degree of freedom than in the basic model and thus the set of possible equilibriums becomes much larger. More precisely each combination of initial parameters ' = (v i ; g i ; v s ; g s ; b; ) can support several separating equilibrium, in most cases a continuum of equilibria. We will denote an equilibrium as ; 2 (') where (') denotes the set of all possible separating equilibriums when the exogenous parameters are given by '. We will show however that in qualitative aspects the results are very similar to those found in the basic model. First of all, Lemma 7 (see Appendix) shows that the valuation of securities in this setting has a lot in common with pure …nancing scenarios. For instance, the share price depends only on the …rm's total value and not on the rate of earnings growth. Secondly, we show that an increase of debt in the capital structure of type i reduces the potential earnings of s if it mimics i and conversely an increase of equity in the capital structure of s reduces the potential payo¤ of i if it mimics s.
Lemma 8. @V si (b e )=@b e > 0; @V is (b e )=@b e < 0: Lemma 8 leads to the following result.
Proposition 5. For each set of exogenous parameters ' there exist two subsets of separating equilibriums 1 and 2 ; 1 \ 2 = ?; 1 [ 2 = (') such that: 1) in any 2 1 i uses a higher fraction of debt …nancing than s; 2) an equilibrium where i plays b e and s plays b 20 1 provides strong support for the results of the basic model about the negative correlation between debt and pro…tability. Firms issuing more equity (type s) have lower leverage during the …rst period and higher pro…tability in that period and vice versa in the second period. On the other hand, 2 is irrelevant in predicting the link between debt and pro…tability since on average among all equilibriums in this set, type i has the same debt as type s. Thus, it is similar to a pooling equilibrium situation which is not able to generate any predictions of this kind.
Proposition 6. 1 is non-empty if and only if the conditions of propositions 2 and 3 hold.
Proposition 7 shows that the negative correlation between debt and profitability is likely to exist when asymmetric information regarding the timing of earnings is large and that about the …rms'total values is small.
5.3. Up-front …nancing. If the …rm is allowed to use up-front …nancing, the main results are not a¤ected. Suppose that in the …rst period the …rm issues securities with a total value larger than b, then invests b in the …rst stage and keeps the rest for the second stage. Consider strategy e. One can show that the share price still depends only on the …rm's total value. Thus the same logic applies. If i uses up-front equity …nancing in equilibrium then the second period claims of type i will be overpriced if type s mimics type i in equilibrium. Another problem with up-front …nancing is that keeping cash can be costly for the …rm (Jensen, 1986). 21 5.4. The case where short-term asymmetry is large and long-term asymmetry is small. Here we discuss the case when condition (3) does not hold. In this case a separating equilibrium may exist with s issuing debt and i issuing equity. The reason is that i has a smaller total value than s and if this di¤erence is large enough a separation may exist. We can show that if such an equilibrium exists then there also exists an equilibrium where i issues debt and s issues equity. Thus, debt issues by i will prevail (this is similar to subsection 5.2).
Conclusions
This paper examines optimal …nancing in a dynamic setting (two-stage investment process) under asymmetric information. The analysis is based on the idea that …rms have private information about their earnings pro…les over time.
The focus is on the analysis of separating equilibria and the link between …rms' operating performance and …nancing strategies. It is shown that a separating equilibrium exists where …rms with a higher rate of earnings growth issue less equity and more debt than …rms with a stagnating pro…le. Thus, the model predicts that: 1) …rms issuing equity underperform in the long run; 2) these …rms have superior performance in the near future after the issue and; 3) there is a negative correlation between debt and pro…tability. According to Ritter and Welch (2002) long-term underperformance is one of the most intriguing phenomena in corporate …nance. This paper has brought forth some new results which have not been tested in existing literature. Long-term operating underperformance of …rms issuing equity should be more frequently observed when: 1) reorganization costs increase (Proposition 2) and; 2) asymmetric information regarding the timing of cash ‡ows is larger than that regarding the total cash ‡ows (Proposition 3).
denote the dividend per share (total dividend) paid in period 2 when …rst-period earnings are r x1 and second-period earnings are r x2 . The following equations determine the prices of issued securities: 1) budget constraint for equity issue:
2) market valuation of shares (share price equals the expected amount of dividends per share):
3) total dividend in period t:
4) earnings distribution in period t:
5) market valuation of second-period debt:
Substituting (22)- (25) into (21) produces:
Further using the identity maxfr x2 F rx1 x2 ; 0g + minfr x2 ; F rx1 x2 g = r x2 and (26) we get:
This equation together with (20) produces:
Also from (25):
We have: 6) market valuation of …rst-period debt:
Equation (30) takes into account that if …rst-period cash ‡ow is not su¢ cient to pay short-term debt the creditors get the fraction of the …rm's equity. 7) market valuation of second-period debt:
Equation (30) can be written as
Using (31), f 0 x = 0 and the identity:
we get:
(32) and (33) imply
(34) implies that if x2 < 2b, condition (29) holds. If x2 2b then F x1 = b (debt is risk-free). If r x1 = 0 then debt can be rolled over by issuing a new claim with a face value F r x = b= x2 . Since x2 2b the …rm will be able to …nance the second stage by issuing a new claim with a face value F 0 x2 = b= x2 . Strategy l. There is no default in t = 1. If long-term debt is junior then the …rm distributes as much cash in dividend as possible in t = 1 and borrows b in the second period. Then we have: 8) value of long-term debt:
wherer 2 denotes the funds remaining after the payment to second-period debtholders:r 2 = maxfr x2 F rx1 x2 ; 0g. Also: 9) market valuation of second-period debt:
Which implies:
F x2 and b = x2 F x2 if 1 b= x2 > F x2 . The latter implies F x2 = b= x2 and x2 > 2b and the former gives x2 = 2b and F x2 1=2. In the latter case F x2 does not matter as long as F x2 1=2 (long-term creditors capture all residual earnings after the payment to the second-period creditors) and thus we can assume F x2 = 1=2 = b= x2 . Finally, strategy l is only possible if x2 2b and F x2 = b= x2 .
If long-term debt is senior and x2 2b then we have 1 F x2 + F 0 x2 where F x2 = b= x2 and F 0 x2 = b= x2 . The debtholders' payo¤ does not depend on …rst-period earnings (which will be distributed in total to the shareholders) but only on second-period earnings. If r x2 = 1 they are paid in full, otherwise they get nothing. If x2 < 2b then if r x1 = 0 the …rm is not able to …nance the second stage externally and thus the entrepreneur o¤ers the creditors a claim with a real value equal to 0. The creditors will accept the o¤er because if they do not, they will not have a legal right to appeal in contrast to the short-term debt scenario, and the …rm will not …nance the second stage. Finally if x2 < 2b …nancing with long-term debt is impossible.
Proof of Lemma 2. Obviously i1 s1 implies i2 > s2 by (1). By Lemma 1, any claim issued by i has a higher value than that of type s; meaning that s will always mimic i (if they play a di¤erent strategy) and a separating equilibrium does not exist. Now s2 i2 implies s1 > i1 and we have the same situation as above, except that now the roles are reversed: i mimics s. End proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. If i1 s1 then by Lemma 2 a separating equilibrium does not exist. Consider i1 < s1 . Then, by the de…nition of g and from g i = g s we have i2 < s2 . By Lemma 2, a separating equilibrium does not exist. End proof.
Proof of Lemma 3. Using (2), (5), Lemma 1 and the following identity:
(the …rst term is strictly positive and the second term is non-negative because
The proof is analogous for the rest of the Lemma (all parts of proofs, omitted for brevity, are available upon demand). End proof.
Proof of Lemma 4. Using (2), (5) 
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that a separating equilibrium exists where i plays equity. Then the following should hold:
Also:
This inequality follows from Lemmas 3 and 4, the continuity of R e (:), (15) and (16). From (38) the condition (36) cannot be true. End proof.
Proof of Lemma 5. Since i2 < 2b we have from (6) and (7):
This is positive by (14 
(the second term is obviously strictly negative and the …rst term is strictly negative because i2 < 2b, 1 and s2 < i2 ). The rest of lemma follows from this inequality. End proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. From our previous proofs (19) holds. From the …rst part of Lemma 6, (18) holds if and only if g s g s (other parameters being equal). The second part of proposition 3 follows from the second part of Lemma 6. End proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that a separating equilibrium exists where i plays long-term debt. From (14) and Lemma 1 the claims issued by type i have higher value than the symmetric information value of claims issued by type s. Thus s will mimic i. End proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. Lemma 7. If information is symmetric then: 
Thus @V si (b e ) @b e = ( i2 b)( s1 i2 i1 s2
By (14), this expression attains its minimum when = 1 and it is 
By Lemma 8
From (42) and (43) we have:
Analogously we get V is (b e ) i1 + i2 2b
(44) and (45) Proof of Proposition 6. Su¢ ciency. It obviously follows from propositions 2 and 3: an equilibrium where i issues only debt and s issues only equity exists and it belongs to 1 . Necessity. Suppose that the conditions of propositions 2 and 3 do not hold and 1 is non-empty. Thus a separating equilibrium exists. Then by Lemma 8 there also exists a separating equilibrium where i issues only debt and s issues only equity which contradicts the assumption that the conditions of propositions 2 and 3 do not hold. End proof.
